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Colonial-era administrative institutions and doctrines are fundamental to
any analysis of Westminster’s legacy in the Caribbean. Applying the
lens of ‘Public Service Bargains’ (PSBs) – the formal and informal
understandings of reward, competence and loyalty of public servants –
we ﬁrst examine constitutional and administrative doctrines regarding
the public service of Crown Colonies, before analysing how these
worked themselves out in Jamaica. Our analysis reveals a number of
perceived deﬁciencies in the PSB in the pre-independence period that
cast a shadow on future relations in the post-independence period.
Keywords: colonial administration; Jamaica; Public Service Bargains;
development administration; civil service; Westminster system
Introduction
No study of ‘Westminster in the Caribbean’ can afford to ignore the role of
colonial-era administration. In Jamaica, the 1944 Constitution introduced insti-
tutions of democracy into existing colonial-led political structures (indepen-
dence came in 1962); however, such institutions were overlaid onto a set of
administrative structures and doctrines which had developed since the impo-
sition of Crown Colony rule in 1866. In the study of a ‘Westminster in the Car-
ibbean’, consideration should therefore not just be paid to the supposed features
of ‘majoritarian’ systems (Lijphart, 1999). Instead, attention needs to be paid to
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the long-standing impact of Whitehall onto political and administrative life in
former colonies. Unsurprisingly, the British administrative legacy has had an
enduring inﬂuence on Jamaica’s post-colonial democratic development. After
all, colonial administration in Jamaica represented a notion of ‘trusteeship’,
based on institutional arrangements that sought to insulate the public service
from local political actors. This legacy of insulation shaped the relationship
between administration and post-independence political movements and has
been a source of criticism, especially by domestic elites who repeatedly blamed
a lack of civil service responsiveness for Jamaica’s poor development outcomes
(e.g.Manley, 1974, pp. 185–187). ForManley and others of his generation, Jamai-
ca’s inherited civil servicemodel and its alignment (especially prior to 1945) to the
colonial service and its objectives were an anathema to post-independence notions
of representativeness, as well as an obstacle to post-colonial transformation.
In the following, the pre-independence legacy is examined through the lens
of ‘Public Service Bargains’ (PSBs): the formal and informal rules and conven-
tions governing expectations about reward, competence and loyalties of public
servants (Hood & Lodge, 2006). The next section, therefore, outlines the key
features of the PSB as it developed within the institutions of colonial rule in
Jamaica. Then, we draw on the archival record to trace the way in which
these institutions shaped particular expectations of reward, competence and
loyalty in the half-century or so leading up to independence. The fourth
section draws together our overall ﬁndings. We conclude by brieﬂy considering
the implications of our ﬁndings for contemporary debates about the appropriate
role of the civil service in Jamaica’s post-colonial democratic development.
PSBs in the Jamaican context
PSBs are deﬁned as the explicit or implicit agreements involving reward, com-
petency and loyalty between public servants – the civil and uniformed services
of the state – and those in the wider political system that they serve. (Hood &
Lodge, 2006, p. 6; also Lodge & Stirton, 2009). In the traditional Whitehall
PSB, in return for agreeing to ‘anonymity, some sacriﬁce of political rights
and proﬁcient performance’, British civil servants were assured, ‘prominent
careers, honours and a six-hour working day when the middle classes
wanted just that, and neutrality was possible, credible and inexpensive’ (Schaf-
fer, 1973, p. 252). Earlier, Lipson noted how, in New Zealand, the 1912 Public
Service Act represented a ‘mutually beneﬁcial bargain’ between civil servants
whose careers and pensions were guaranteed, and political parties which, in
turn, were owed equal loyalty when in government:
With the political parties the modern [New Zealand] civil service has struck a
mutually beneﬁcial bargain. By guaranteeing to public servants a life’s career
and a pension, parties have foresworn the use of patronage and have guaranteed
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to the state’s employees their tenure of their jobs. In return the parties expect, and
the public servants owe, equal loyalty to any government which the party have
placed in ofﬁce. (1948, p. 479)
Both Lipson’s and Schaffer’s formulations are sensitive to the conditions and
informal understandings under which politics and public servants relate to
each other, and to the wider constitutional, administrative and social environ-
ment. Complications might arise as ‘ministers shufﬂe out of their part of the
bargain, the demands of proﬁciency increase and even British civil servants
no longer get their old guaranteed ration of honours’ (Schaffer, 1973,
pp. 252–253). Equally, civil servants may also shufﬂe out of their part of the
bargain, by failing to deliver on expectations of loyalty (whether to individual
politician, party in government, or the ‘state’) or proﬁciency.
What then, can be said of the ‘Whitehall PSB’ that was transplanted to the
context of Jamaica? Crown Colony rule was imposed in Jamaica in 1866 fol-
lowing metropolitan outrage at the heavy-handed reaction to the Morant Bay
rebellion of 1865. In constitutional theory, the Governor was directly accoun-
table to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and was the sole authority
responsible to and representative of the Sovereign. A Legislative Council pro-
vided for some degree of consultation, but was under the effective control of the
Governor, who – in addition to controlling the appointment of ex ofﬁcio
members of the executive – could nominate additional members. The under-
lying idea was to maintain executive control while drawing in (through nomi-
nation) select members of the local elites, who were nonetheless outweighed by
ofﬁcial members. A measure of representation was introduced in 1884, with the
introduction of nine elected members into the Legislative Council, increased to
14 in 1893. Domination by the governor was in practice moderated to some
extent by constitutional convention, but remained overwhelming since, in the
last instance, the Governor’s power to declare a measure to be of ‘paramount
importance’ could force any measure (Barnett, 1977, pp. 9–15).
Political oversight by elected representatives became a signiﬁcant feature of
Jamaican administration only after 1944. The 1944 Constitution provided for
an elected Executive Council to act as ‘the principal instrument of policy’,
while the Legislative Council became the upper house of a bicameral legisla-
ture, which also comprised a new House of Representatives. The shift in the
style of government meant that, for the ﬁrst time, it was the voices of elected
members – in the form of Chairs of Standing Committees in the new House
of Representatives – rather than the voices of civil servants that were heard
in matters concerning the work of Government Departments (Byles, 1948,
pp. 64–65). The 1953 Constitution continued this trend. The development of
an ‘incipient Cabinet system’ (Barnett, 1977, p. 18) introduced elements of
the concept of responsible government (in the British context, see Birch,
10 M. Lodge et al.
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1964) into the Jamaican constitution, more fully developed under the 1959
Constitution which granted internal self-government to Jamaica.
In general, Crown Colony government thus represented a particular under-
standing of trusteeship. It allowed for limited participatory political institutions,
while the colonial administrations’ loyalties were directed towards the British
Empire rather than local economic elites. The overall goal of the trusteeship
doctrine was to achieve a ‘general improvement of the standard of native
life’ (Lord Moyne’s 1932 report on Kenya, CO533/421/1).1 By the time inde-
pendence had appeared on the agenda, the doctrine of ‘preparation’ was deﬁned
as
ruling a country for the beneﬁt of its people while they are the wards of a bene-
volent trustee, and also to train them for the self-government and independence
which British policy intends that they should achieve in as short a time as is
reasonably possible. (Robertson, 1961, p. 313)
The operative ideas of trusteeship within the colonial PSB emphasised limited
oversight from the Colonial Ofﬁce. The idea that Crown Colonies were admi-
nistered from London was ‘the one rank heresy we all shudder at’ (Hyam, 1999,
p. 257). Rather, Colonial Ofﬁce doctrine emphasised ‘on the spot’ rule by Gov-
ernors with the Colonial Ofﬁce performing ‘an essential function of cautious
criticism’ (Hyam, 1999, p.257). A further principle was that colonial order
had to be maintained on the basis of least coercive expense (Darwin, 2012,
p. 190), regardless of whether concerns were of a geopolitical, military, com-
mercial or missionary basis.
In sum, a number of constitutional and administrative features shaped the
evolving PSB in Jamaica: First, insulation from domestic elites, together
with lines of executive accountability, via the Colonial Secretary and through
the Governor, meant that loyalty was to the Sovereign, and thus to the (metro-
politan) government of the day. The Colonial Ofﬁce saw its role as limited in
terms of oversight. Second, competence was to provide for government that
would smooth the way towards self-government. Third, the reward dimension
was to reﬂect the local conditions themselves.
Criticism focused on these PSB dimensions. Harold Laski, for example,
pointed to a lack of reward and competency, as well as loyalty among colonial
administrators. It was, he suggested, ‘difﬁcult to suggest what are the purposes
of the British Colonial Empire for those who are responsible for its mainten-
ance’ (Laski, 1938, p. 541). According to Laski, the ideal of trusteeship was:
too ﬂattering to the results obtained. It is hardly compatible with the historic inci-
dence of the facts. It is a word whose sound is too noble for the squalid results too
often attained; for, in many cases, whether the test taken be standard of life, public
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health, education, or growth of ﬁtness for self-government, the colonies remain,
in large degree, the slums of empire. (1938, p. 541)
Recruitment was pursued on too narrow lines, failing to develop ‘educated
coloured people’ (Laski, 1938, p. 547). The emphasis was on ‘sound men’
rather than ‘innovators’ who did not learn from other colonial experiences,
who failed to engage conscientiously with London, the repression of opposition
movements, such as trade unions, and Treasury determination to run an
Empire ‘on the cheap’. Policy-making, according to Laski, was on the basis
of precedent, control was ‘gravely bureaucratic in nature’ (1938, p. 548),
leading to a ‘lack of imagination, complacency about . . . larger issues,
absence of sympathy for the educated members of the subject peoples’
(1938, p. 550).
Laski’s diagnosis was paralleled by civil servants. For example, a former
governor general of Nigeria noted how the post-1945 world had brought
about a change in terms of the ‘unquestioning certainty in our attitude to our
task, doubts about whether democracy was an appropriate form of government,
and also the realisation that “trusteeship” was no longer accepted by the gov-
erned population’ (Robertson, 1961, p. 313). Similarly, a leading Colonial
Ofﬁce civil servant noted in his ‘administrative memoir’ how the uniﬁcation
of the colonial service in 1930 had created a cadre of individuals which,
together with a growing willingness from London politicians to fund develop-
ment, could have launched an era of planning and development, especially as
part of the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act (Jeffries, 1972, p. 9).
However, the post-1945 world was a different one, where the priority was the
seemingly inevitable move towards de-colonisation, rather than a planning-
driven colonial policy.
A generation after Laski, Schaffer (1973, pp. 205–209) painted a similar
picture. Rather than trusteeship and preparation, the path towards independence
had been characterised by resistance, especially towards extending participa-
tory institutions, by the narrow recruitment pool. Competent colonial govern-
ment was, according to Schaffer, deﬁned as the maintenance of law and
revenue ﬂows, as well as efﬁciency – rather than developing local administra-
tive talent. Such absence proved even more problematic, given the lack of evol-
ving understandings of politicians and civil servants, as well as the need to
‘localise’ a bureaucratic leadership characterised by expatriates.
PSBs in practice
To examine the PSB in evolving debates surrounding the civil service in
Jamaica in the period prior to independence, we rely on ofﬁcial documentation,
material found in national archives (in London and Spanish Town, Jamaica)
12 M. Lodge et al.
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and the historical online archive of the Jamaican daily, The Gleaner. These have
been supplemented to some extent by a review of secondary sources, memoirs
and, where possible, interviews. As will become evident, some ofﬁcial reports
are directed more at the Colonial Ofﬁce and its approach towards Jamaica (and
the Commonwealth Caribbean); other reports focused more on the PSB apply-
ing to local civil servants. Nevertheless, they provide a good insight into the
overall PSB that was said to apply to colonial administration in Jamaica,
albeit from a predominantly ‘top-down’ perspective.
We concentrate on the evolution of such understandings through ﬁve key
reports written in the era under consideration. These are: (1) The 1919 Legis-
lative Council Select Committee established to consider salary increases (Select
Committee of the Legislative Council, 1919); (2) the Report of the Salaries
Commission (Salaries Commission, 1929); (3) the West India Royal Commis-
sion report (Guinness, 1st Baron Moyne, 1945); (4) The Report of the Commit-
tee on the Public Service in Jamaica 1939–1942 (Hodges, 1942); (5) The
Report of the Commission on the Public Service in Jamaica (Mills, 1949). In
addition to these ﬁve reports, we consider also the issue of transition agree-
ments in the lead-up to independence for Jamaica. The analysis starts in the
immediate post-First World War period when concerns about the quality of
governance in the colonies had become particularly salient.
Select Committee report 1919
Following the end of the First WorldWar, a Select Committee of the Legislative
Council was established to consider ‘applications for temporary or permanent
increase in salaries or wages [after 10th April 1919, and] to consider these
applications and the question of the revision of emoluments paid in the Civil
Service generally’ (Select Committee of the Legislative Council, 1919, para.
1). The select committee was also invited to look at ‘the economy and efﬁ-
ciency of the various Government Departments’ (Select Committee of the Leg-
islative Council, 1919, para. 1).
The catalyst was the increase in the cost of living post-First World War. This
was said to have resulted in considerable hardship, especially to Assistants
whose position was said to have become increasingly vulnerable. In 1918,
the government was forced to concede that no ofﬁcial notice would be taken
of bankruptcy proceedings against ofﬁcers. The implicit admission that salaries
were insufﬁcient to live was, according to The Gleaner ‘a damaging admission,
a thing that was a reproach to this country, a startling disgrace’ (The Gleaner,
22 October 1919). The Committee agreed that
the salaries paid should be sufﬁcient to enable a man to live; it may be that others
are dependent on him, but apart from that under the present circumstances it does
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not seem possible for a man to live on £78 a year, nor is it easy to do so on £100.
(Select Committee of the Legislative Council, 1919, para. 8)
Inadequate salaries were said to lead to a loss of proﬁciency particularly at the
Assistant level: ‘At present many young Assistants resign their positions, either
to take up more lucrative appointments or to go abroad; and so, promising Ofﬁ-
cers are lost to the Service’ (Select Committee of the Legislative Council, 1919,
para. 8). A separate minute by one of the Select Committee members,
J. H. Phillips (member for St Thomas) pointed to another reason for this attri-
tion: ‘There are men in the Service who are admittedly clogging the advance-
ment of others by their incapacity, and have been doing so for years past’
(Select Committee of the Legislative Council, 1919, Ch. XI). He added, ‘“Pro-
motion by merit” does not naturally meet with universal approval in a service
where “promotion by seniority” has generally been the rule’ (Select Committee
of the Legislative Council, 1919, Ch. XI). The majority of the Select Commit-
tee rejected proposals for voluntary or compulsory retirement at age 40 or 45
which, being contrary to the principle of employment at the pleasure of the
Crown, ‘would revolutionise the theory and practice of the Service, and
might conceivably tend to disorganisation’ (Select Committee of the Legisla-
tive Council, 1919, para. 4).
The recommended salary increases, including a starting salary of £100 per
annum for Assistants, were described by The Gleaner as ‘substantial’ (The
Gleaner, 10 December 1919). Debates did not solely focus on salary but the
increase in the burden of work: ‘[ . . . ] within the last 20 years the work with
respect to every Government Department has considerably increased . . . [as]
the Government has . . . undertaken new duties in various ﬁelds’ (Select Com-
mittee of the Legislative Council, 1919, para. 15). Such increases in work had
not been matched by an increase in the civil service establishment. The
Committee regarded better salaries as more valuable than an increase in
manpower: ‘pay them well, and work them hard’ was its recommendation
(Select Committee of the Legislative Council, 1919, para. 15). Furthermore,
‘selection should be of the candidate, male or female, who is best qualiﬁed,
having regard to the nature of the work’ (Select Committee of the Legislative
Council, 1919, para. 15).
Salaries Commission, 1929
Issues of reward and competence were again raised by a Salaries Commission
1929 (Jamaica Archives 1B/5/235, Jamaica Archives 1B/5/77/126-1929 and
Jamaica Archives 1B/5/77/231; full report in The Daily Gleaner (6 March
1929). The Commission was established in response to a proposal of the Gov-
ernor General. Its terms of reference covered salary levels, and the possibility of
14 M. Lodge et al.
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achieving economies of staff numbers. The ﬁnal report had little to offer in
terms of staff reductions, even recommending the expansion of some scientiﬁc
and technical positions.
The Commission concluded that ‘taken as a whole, the Civil Service of this
Colony is underpaid’, leading to a situation where ‘the promising youth of the
Colony is being attracted into other walks of life’ (Daily Gleaner, 6 March
1929). In an era when admission into executive work was (except for some
central appointments) through promotion from the rank of Assistant, the Com-
mission’s recommendations aimed to attract
a type that can not only be moulded into an efﬁcient clerk but which will in course
of time be likely to develop those qualities which are essential in the men who can
aspire to the higher ofﬁces of Government. (Daily Gleaner, 6 March 1929)
The administration rejected the most signiﬁcant recommendations in respect to
salary and grading structure, namely the abolition of the distinction between a
ﬁrst- and second-class clerk into a single grade. It favoured the minority report
by a representative on the Commission of the private sector, which rec-
ommended only relatively modest increases in salary (‘it must be remembered
that the majority of Tax-payers are in not as favourable position as are members
of the Service’ and warning of the risks of making commitments ‘until the
island has, without any doubt, stabilised its prosperity’ (Daily Gleaner, 6
March 1929)).
On equal pay between the sexes, the Colonial Secretary’s views went further
than recommendation that female recruits should be paid £100 per annum, the
same as Assistants: ‘when Assistants join the Service, they are of little value.
They have to be taught their job; but a stenographer comes into the service
with a thorough knowledge of her job, namely Typing and Stenography’
(Jamaica Archives 1B/5/77/126-1929). Furthermore, the Colonial Secretary
was opposed to the recommendation that civil servants should be given a lunch-
eon hour, arguing that it ‘would be hopelessly abused by a lot of people who
would simply be out of the ofﬁce for an hour’ (Jamaica Archives 1B/5/77/231).
The Report criticised the inadequacy of local recruitment practices, includ-
ing long waiting lists of qualiﬁed candidates: ‘The result is that the best candi-
dates tire of waiting and only those who have not succeeded in obtaining other
satisfactory employment retain their names on the list and are eventually
appointed to the service’ (Daily Gleaner, 6 March 1929). The Commission’s
damning conclusion linked issues of reward to competency: ‘The present
system of selection appears to us to be no system of selection at all’ (Daily
Gleaner, 6 March 1929). Ofﬁcial discussion agreed that the system ‘does not
tend to attract to the Service the type of young man which is so very necessary’
(Jamaica Archives 1B/5/77/231).
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Improvement was seen to lie in personal interviews. As noted by one senior
ofﬁcer, candidates were
so similar in qualiﬁcation that they might have been all turned out from the same
mould in a mass production factory. They have all passed the Junior Cambridge,
all possess the same glowing testimonials from the referees, and all profess to a
love for and proﬁciency in games.
A new system, ‘might afford the Selection Committee some facts on which to
divide the candidates into at least two classes of sheep and goats’ (Jamaica
Archives 1B/5/77126-1929).
Report of the West India Royal Commission (the ‘Moyne Report’, 1945)
Insights into the climate that generated Laski’s comment on the colonial civil
service can be gleaned from the report of a Royal Commission chaired by
Lord Moyne. This report was initiated in June following strikes and unrest
that had erupted all over the British West Indies in 1938. To avoid a German
propaganda coup due to the Report’s damning conclusions, only the executive
summary was published. The completed report of 1939 was suppressed until
after the Second World War (Cmd. 6607).
The establishment of the Royal Commission was motived by the unrest wit-
nessed in the Caribbean islands that was blamed on the spread of ‘modern ideas
. . . amongst the coloured people’. According to the Secretary of State for the
Colonies’ note to his cabinet colleagues, ‘[ . . . ] the economic conditions of the
coloured communities in the colonies are at least ﬁfty years behind the times
and it is not too much to say that their condition constitutes a reproach to
our colonial administration’; indeed, a further deterioration would ‘prove
very damaging to Great Britain’s reputation as a colonial power’ (CAB 21/
809, 17 June 1938). Blame was placed at the door of the narrow and reactionary
franchise that informed the legislatures, as well as the ‘low standard of admin-
istration’ that British rule had ‘obliged to maintain owing to local preferences
for appointments of local men and to the extremely low salaries which some of
the Colonies can afford’. Indeed, the low salaries and conditions of service
deterred ‘good ofﬁcers from the Colonial Service generally’, leading to
social progress being ‘retarded’ (CAB 21/809, 17 June 1938). It was argued
that any work would be futile if there was no up-front commitment by HM
Government to provide enhanced funding.
The Moyne Report similarly argued that one of the problems of colonial
administration had been that colonies had to largely cover their own expenses.
In response, the Colonial Development and Welfare Act 1940 provided central
funds for the provision of education, health, housing and social welfare (among
16 M. Lodge et al.
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other matters), as well as for training programmes for the civil servants who
were to administer these funds.
While acknowledging island-speciﬁc factors, the Report condemned with a
‘sense of shame’ the ‘situation which now exists’; ‘we are the biggest land-
owners in the world, and we allow our people to live in these conditions’. Simi-
larly, the Report noted that the causes for this widespread malaise were partly
economic, partly constitutional. In fact, social regeneration was ‘not possible
under the present form of government’. Particular criticism was reserved for
issues of rewards and competency.
On the one hand, colonial administration was hampered by the fact that the
‘tropical climate’ had an effect on ‘a man’s health and mental capacity’, but also
that a one-year absence from the ‘home administration’ led to a
very deteriorating effect upon his administrative capacity [ . . . ] there are far too
many men today waiting for their pension and putting off reforms, which they
know should be tackled, rather than run the risk of unpopularity with the Colonial
Ofﬁce or in the Colony itself.
This lack of initiative was a result of being ‘a little out of touch with the main
currents of opinion in the territories for which they are responsible’, due to
‘continuous meetings with the well-to-do’.
On the other hand, insufﬁcient rewards contributed to a poor standard of
living and lack of resources to pursue interventionist policies: ‘civil servants
are expected to live up to a high standard of respectability, and to maintain
the social status of the class to which they belong [ . . . however . . . ] they are
constrained to practice the strictest economy, which often entails residence in
mean dwellings with inadequate accommodation, appearing at work almost
poorly clad, and in some cases, foregoing the regular use of nourishing
food’, thus ‘the Colonial Ofﬁce and the local administrations have been embar-
rassed, have been hindered and hampered at almost every turn, by the vulner-
able position of these Colonies; and that is one of the absolutely fundamental
weaknesses of their position’ (ofﬁcial report). Indeed, local administration
which was ‘not really . . . of a sufﬁciently high standard’ due to the
perhaps natural insistence of the local Legislatures in most cases that local
candidates should be appointed . . . and low salaries and conditions of services
are often such as they would not in any case attract good ofﬁcers from the
Colonial Service generally.
The problem was, however, also one affecting the Colonial Ofﬁce; Lord Moyne
suggested that its weakness was due to its origins and that it ‘has always rather
suffered from prenatal experiences’.
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In other words, the criticism of the appalling conditions in the West Indies
that had given rise to rioting and fear of destabilisation, was directed at the
quality of administrative and political rule, and at the heart of those criticisms
was the nature of the PSB: a disinterest in initiative (if not actual discourage-
ment) led to risk-averse and poorly trained civil servants who were also
poorly rewarded for their services. The response, the 1940 Act, was supposed
to bring the promise of a different kind of developmental administration, one
where a ‘well-equipped Colonial Ofﬁce was now a necessary instrument of
British colonial policy’ (Jeffries, 1972, p. 16). Such hopes were quickly
dashed, if only because of the institutional inheritance of a colonial service
in which public services in each territory had remained distinct, and where
serving ofﬁcials were paid by the colony they were currently serving. Co-ordi-
nation in terms of perks and other aspects of the PSB were therefore a matter of
negotiation, rather than central imposition. In addition, there was a reluctance to
merge civil servants working for the Colonial Ofﬁce with those working for the
colonial service (i.e. those civil servants working in the colonies). The decision,
in 1944, not to merge these services was widely seen as a political signal that
certain understandings would not be forthcoming:
if the scheme had gone through it would have established the principle that the
British government accepted responsibility not only for making suitable staffs
available to the colonial territories, but also for securing suitable terms for the ofﬁ-
cers employed, and [ . . . ] providing funds for this purpose. (Jeffries, 1972, p. 33)
Committee on the Public Service in Jamaica 1939–1942
Shortly before the publication of the Moyne Report’s executive summary, a
Committee on the Public Service in Jamaica was established in 1939, ‘to
review the existing organisation, emoluments, and other conditions of employ-
ment of the Public Service in Jamaica and to make recommendations . . . ’
(Hodges, 1942, para. 1). The Report was critical of the Salaries Commission
1929 and the ofﬁcial response, commenting sarcastically on the additional
expenditure on salaries of around £14,000 per annum provided to address pro-
blems of an underpaid service that ‘It can only be concluded that this condition
of affairs was corrected relatively cheaply’ (Hodges, 1942, para. 6). On the
additional payments to clerks, ‘it is clear to us that, in the subsequent years,
this provision failed to solve a question which . . . has given rise to much of
the dissatisfaction which persists in the Civil Service today’ (Hodges, 1942,
para. 6). The continued inadequacy of civil service salaries was conﬁrmed
by G. E. Mills, a civil servant in the 1930s, who recollected that during his
time in the Postmaster General’s department, some ‘older colleagues, barely
subsisting on their meagre salaries, hiding from debt collectors, made weekly
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efforts to eke out their incomes by gambling, greedily anticipating opportu-
nities and occasions for overtime pay’ (Mills, 1994, p. 57).
The Report again highlighted a situation of chronic understafﬁng in the
Service, as well as the inadequacy of prior measures to increase staff: ‘We
are satisﬁed that the majority of Public Ofﬁcers give, not only a full day’s
work, but a considerable amount of overtime, including Sundays and public
holidays . . . In many Departments, vacation and departmental leave are cur-
tailed’ (Hodges, 1942, para. 9). Part of the problem, the Committee argued,
was that there had been a considerable extension of government-provided
social services, and the demands placed even on ordinary Departments had
become far more exacting. An increasing amount of civil service time was
allegedly taken up with dealing with members of the public:
senior ofﬁcers whose duties bring them into contact with the public, ﬁnd little
time during ofﬁce hours to deal with correspondence and normal requirements
of ofﬁce. In many cases, work is done out of ofﬁce hours, leaving no leisure
time for recreation or relaxation. (Hodges, 1942, para. 12)
Problems of overwork also obtained at senior levels, with Heads of Depart-
ments required to chair numerous committees. The Report called for a new
understanding with the public in which ‘the public of Jamaica should have
their business carried on with despatch, with ability and courtesy; but the
public must provide adequate staff for the machinery of Government, and
must pay commensurate sums, by way of salaries . . . ’ (Hodges, 1942, para.
14). The Report drew attention to the comparatively low share of the
colony’s revenues which went to pensions and personal emoluments compared
to other, similarly situated territories.
As with the Salaries Commission more than 10 years earlier, the Committee
found difﬁculties in attracting more than minimally qualiﬁed candidates: ‘the
Civil Service does not offer sufﬁcient attraction to the average boy or girl
with educational qualiﬁcations above what is required to qualify a candidate
to sit for the Civil Service Entrance Examination today’ (Hodges, 1942,
para. 20). This was also a problem given the ‘growing desire on the part of
Jamaicans to senior ofﬁces in the Local Civil Service ﬁlled by Jamaicans’
(Hodges, 1942, para. 22). Higher educational standards, as well as suitable
entry routes for those with advanced educational qualiﬁcations was seen as a
ﬁrst step to encourage ‘the prospective Civil Servant to ﬁt himself for the
responsibilities of executive ofﬁce’ (Hodges, 1942, para. 22). Competence in
the higher levels was also diminished by ‘a system of promotion, which . . .
has tended to give prominence to seniority at the expense of merit and
special qualiﬁcations’ (Hodges, 1942, para. 94).
The Report made recommendations regarding the appointment of univer-
sity graduates – including ‘perhaps to a lesser extent – young women’
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 19
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [L
SE
 L
ibr
ary
 Se
rv
ice
s] 
at 
02
:40
 20
 A
pr
il 2
01
6 
(Hodges, 1942, para. 33). The Report recognised ‘the claim of women to have
some place in the administrative organisation’ but given ‘the peculiar difﬁcul-
ties confronting this country . . . its limited economic prospects and rapidly
increasing population’, the Committee was of the opinion that ‘any large
scale employment of women, in posts which could be satisfactorily ﬁlled by
men, cannot be justiﬁed’ (Hodges, 1942, para. 73).
Transition agreements
Issues of reward and loyalty featured heavily in the immediate period before de-
colonisation. Jamaica was seen as setting a precedent for other jurisdictions in
the Caribbean. There was no debate about ‘preparation’. Instead, the debates
involving ofﬁcials in London and Jamaica were either directed at the rules gov-
erning Public Service Commissions (PSCs), or protecting the perks applicable
to expatriate ofﬁcers who might be affected by independence. To some extent,
these debates qualify the image of an all-powerful and numerous expatriate
class ready to pack the bags and move to remaining parts of the British Empire.
Civil service representatives were incensed by what they perceived to be a
neglect of the Colonial Ofﬁce in the protection of their interests post-independence:
I cannot afford to remain for an Independence which guarantees me nothing
except the possibility of unemployment. I feel strongly that the Colonial Ofﬁce
has failed in its duty to its overseas personnel and has left them ﬂoundering
around without guidance or advice. (CO1031/2972)
Indeed, they argued that expatriate ofﬁcers were ‘not missionaries, but ofﬁcers
for whom the Secretary of State wants compensation from the territory con-
cerned’ (CO137/904/3). In response, the Colonial Ofﬁce agreed that in Gold
Coast in particular, ‘the great majority of senior policymaking posts in the
public service were held by expatriate ofﬁcers sharply distinguished from
their colleagues both by colour and terms of service’ (CO1031/2270). In
those jurisdictions, this arrangement had triggered ‘acute public criticism’
and its continuance was seen as ‘incompatible with the grant of independence’.
Therefore, ‘voluntary retirement’ was offered to these civil servants (CO1031/
2270). These ‘safeguards’ were granted in Malaya, Ghana, Nigeria and Singa-
pore (CO1031/2295).
However, it was argued that Jamaica was different. First of all, the actual
number of such ofﬁcers was low in Jamaica, amounting to ‘only 60 out of
360 administrative, professional and technical ofﬁcers who are eligible for
membership of the HMOCs’ (CO1031/2270). Rather than offering voluntary
retirement to all, individual cases would have to persuade the Secretary of
State that their careers would be prejudiced if they were to continue their
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service post-independence. Indeed, any expatriate who had gone to the West
Indies in recent years had done so ‘with their eyes open’. Civil service union
representatives were (naturally) not persuaded, suspecting that ‘nobody will
qualify’ and that this was a breaking of the bargain as ‘these chaps still
nurture the Colonial Service tradition’ (CO 1031/2270). Again, the poor resour-
cing/rewarding of civil servants in the West Indies were raised:
By accepting posts in the Caribbean they have gained a life full of interest and
responsibility but they have condemned themselves and their families to salaries
and conditions of service very much worse than those of their colleagues who
have stayed where they were or who have been promoted to similar posts on
other parts of the word [ . . . ] Indeed I think there would be strong arguments
for requiring Caribbean territories to pay greater compensation than elsewhere
to make up for the unsatisfactory terms of service which they have got away
with (to their own tragic detriment) for so long. (CO1031/2270)
Second, it was argued that the Jamaican civil service was not shaped by a clear
distinction between ‘local’ and ‘expatriate’ (although ‘locals’ might have disagreed
with the recorded sentiment): it was ‘[ . . . ] not going to make for happier relation-
ships if we now start to make a clear differentiation between “expatriate” and
“local” ofﬁcers. There has never been any real distinction in the Jamaica civil
service’ (CO 1031/2270, Renison (Jm) to Kitkatt (Ldn, also CO1031/2295 (no
date)). In the end, the Colonial Ofﬁce granted civil servants ‘on an individual
basis’ the right to retire with compensation should their career have been adversely
affected as a result of constitutional changes (CO 1031/2295). However, it was also
made clear that it was unlikely that many cases would qualify.
In terms of appointment, the creation of PSCs created the novelty that
appointments continued to be made (formally) by the Secretary of State,
while in practice these procedures should be conducted by the Commissions.
Local politicians (such as Alexander Bustamante) succeeded in removing edu-
cational qualiﬁcations for appointment2 (CO137/904/3). However, more gener-
ally, the change in convention was seen as minimal as the control of
appointment by the Secretary of State had been minimal in the West Indies
(CO1031/227). At the same time, the role of PSCs was seen as critical; once
Jamaica had achieved the status of ‘self-government’, then the PSC would
become an executive organ whose decisions would be more or less binding
on the Governor (who could refer individual cases back for reconsideration,
without being able to veto appointments).
Report on the Commission on the Public Service in Jamaica (TheMills Report)
A further inquiry on the Jamaican public service published in 1950, chaired by
a British civil servant, Eric Mills, addressed many of the key issues regarding
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competency, loyalty and rewards that had emerged in previous reports. First, it
was noted that the lack of capacity characterising local government burdened
and threatened to pre-occupy ‘central authority’ (Mills, 1949, para. 5.3). Fur-
thermore, too much expenditure was centred on social services rather than
on developing economic activity. Blame for such developments was partly
laid at the door of local politics (‘this is almost inevitable in conditions of pol-
itical immaturity deriving from universal adult suffrage’ (Mills, 1949, para
5.6)). Civil servants’ obligation to ‘translate policy on the part of those who,
through election are made the trustees of the interests of the whole people irre-
spective of party’ involved ‘the exclusion of arbitrariness, capriciousness, or
fancifulness’ (Mills, 1949, para 5.7). However, Mills suggested that civil ser-
vants were afraid of speaking truth to politicians as that ‘may put at risk the
career of any public servant’ (1949, para 5.7). Indeed, the Gleaner argued
that Bustamante’s criticism of the Mills Report was largely because of the criti-
cisms about politicians’ behaviour that Mills had noted. In addition, Mills also
criticised civil servants, ridiculing the notion that the tropical climate could be
considered as a major impediment, and condemning ofﬁce accommodation,
accounting and ﬁling systems. He also advocated that pensioned-off police
and prison ofﬁcers should be used as ofﬁce messengers rather than young
people (1949, para 15.1–3).
While the Mills Report desired a ‘ﬂexible articulation in the design and
structure of the instrument of administration, composed in such a manner as
to secure an economical application of the Government of the day’, some
key criticisms of the operating PSB are repeated (CO137/907/3, CO137/904/
1–28 September 1950). In particular, the Report argued that policy-making
at the top was hindered, ‘as things are, they are fettered and frustrated by the
misuse of routine that compels their attention. [Staff] were overburdened . . .
with details of staff administration’ (Mills, 1949, para 39.2). Staff in general
were seen to be insufﬁciently qualiﬁed, given a reliance on secondary education
(Mills, 1949, paras 40.2–40.3), it was underpaid, ineffectively organised, over-
staffed, and not offering sufﬁcient opportunities of ‘promotion for ability’.
Mills therefore argued for the division of the service into administrative and
clerical grades, with direct entry into the administrative service for suitably
qualiﬁed applicants, for the creation of a PSC, for a regrading to ‘retire the
dead wood’, as well as for an increase in pay and living expenses.
The Colonial Ofﬁce, however, noted that these recommendations faced dif-
ﬁculties, given the problematic ﬁnancial position of the island. Bustamante
demanded higher taxes rather than expenditure reductions to pay for higher
wages (as he suspected civil servants’ suffering to be comparable to other
Jamaicans), while the Civil Service Association accepted the need for a reor-
ganisation, although it noted that salary scale adjustments meant that the
civil service continued to remain ‘unattractive’. Neither of the two main
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political parties was interested in taking up the issue of wage demands, because,
as the Colonial Ofﬁce put it, ‘Mills’ proposals are about all Jamaica can afford’
(CO137/904/1, 28 September 1950). Manley and his party advocated the split
between administrative and clerical grades (unlike Bustamante who success-
fully vetoed proposals that would have allowed for entry into the administrative
class not solely through the clerical route).3
The recommendations of the Mills Report were seen as establishing the
‘foundation for a better civil service’, as it potentially accelerated promotion
opportunities (CO137/904/1, 28 September 1950). However, the recommen-
dations regarding salary increases had to be delayed, given political opposition
and the precarious ﬁnancial position that made the proposed increases unaf-
fordable. The debates regarding the PSC, in contrast, focused largely on the
powers of the Secretary of State, the extent to which the Commission’s
powers should be restrained until independence (as advocated by the governor
general) and how to achieve consistency across different Caribbean territories
(CO137/904/2).
A colonial PSB?
Across the reports and debates considered above, the central focus was on the
main dimensions of the PSB, but very little on the implications for the wider
development of relations between bureaucracy and the political system. Such
concerns emerged primarily in the context of the more immediate discussions
surrounding pending independence. In this section, each PSB dimension is dis-
cussed in turn, paying attention to the shifting emphases over time that reﬂect
different sensitivities that shape how assumptions about (colonial) government
from Westminster were reﬂected in debates about administration in the colo-
nies. Our ﬁndings are summarised in Table 1, below.
In terms of reward, the continuing theme is one of low pay and poor pro-
motion opportunities as well as to some extent poor living and working con-
ditions. Particularly in the earlier part of the period we considered, the lack
of structured recruitment processes, and an entrenched resistance to appoint-
ment on merit was also said to stand in the way of attracting candidates who
went beyond the minimal qualiﬁcations. To some extent, the ofﬁcial record
needs to be tempered by interview evidence which suggested that for brown
or black Jamaicans from the 1930s onwards, the civil service represented a
prestigious career, attracting high-achieving scholarship students from rural
areas, and indeed that the service in the Jamaican civil service was seen as
an attractive career opportunity for ofﬁcers of other territories. Mills (1994,
p. 59) notes that with the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, the Treasury
began to challenge the dominance of the Secretariat (previously the main
policy-making department, headed by the Colonial Secretary), and this
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provided opportunities for brown and black Jamaicans who were in practice
excluded from the Secretariat.
Criticism was also raised regarding the preference of the ‘locals’ and the
way in which the desire by some parties to protect a career structure where indi-
viduals started at the clerical ‘bottom’ and could rise to the administrative ‘top’
prohibited the direct recruitment of individuals into the administrative grade.
Whereas the reward side was directly linked to the competence aspect of the
PSB in the earlier reports, those documents and correspondence that sought
to prepare Jamaica for independence pointed to the inherent link between
reward and loyalty. For example, it was argued that career civil servants
deserved not to be abandoned by the Colonial Ofﬁce.
Similarly, in terms of competence, there was continued discontent with the
capability of individual civil servants, as well as the overall organisational set-
up. In terms of the latter, a continuous theme throughout the reports was that the
colonial leadership, that is, colonial governor and heads of departments, was
overburdened with the ‘wrong’ activities. The lack of capacity at the local gov-
ernment level further impeded the capacity of the colony-wide administration
as it displaced activity and generated further local dissatisfaction. In contrast,
other parts of the civil service were seen as poorly skilled. This was reﬂected
in repeated demands for university graduates to be recruited, and to allow
for direct entry into the administrative grades. Indeed, the Mills Report and
the Salaries Commission made the case for the recruitment of scientists.
Table 1. Overview of PSB-related debates in Jamaica.
Whitehall-legacy
(as deﬁned by Schaffer)
Observed patterns
(to 1945)
Observed patterns
(1945–1962)
Reward Comfortable reward,
certain degree of
security and
predictability
Continued themes of
insufﬁcient reward,
and poor
promotion
opportunities
Insufﬁcient reward,
improved promotion
opportunities (local).
Secure and
predictable tenure
Competency Competent operation
in the light of
preferences of
government of the
day
Lack of expertise and
skill, although
increase in
Jamaican entrants
by 1930s
Lack of expertise and
skill, the civil service
was seen as a
prestigious career,
attracting some of
the best and brightest
local students
Loyalty Loyal service to the
‘government of
the day’
Hardly mentioned,
only in context of
criticism that
government is
‘shufﬂing’ out
Remained a marginal
issue. Increased
tensions as
independence
approached
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However, such attempts were stiﬂed by local politics. As noted, by Moyne and
other reports, poor salaries and the perception of fear to be exposed to criticism
(and worse) from local actors as well as the Colonial Ofﬁce itself led to a
decision style that was seen as risk averse and accommodating ‘dead wood’
(therefore, the Mills Report suggested a re-grading to allow for difﬁcult
choices to be made).
Loyalty was perhaps the least-discussed dimension of the PSB, suggesting
that the underlying assumptions were never really questioned. This is perhaps
not surprising in an era where ofﬁcers acted within a direct line hierarchy
extending, via the Colonial Secretary to the Governor. Yet starting with the
1939–1942 report, one sees an emerging issue as to whom civil servants are
loyal: the Government or the wider public? As independence approached, we
also observe increasing evidence of a concern with the implications for civil
servants from independence. The Colonial Ofﬁce somewhat fatalistically
noted that it was likely that post-independence life would witness politicisation.
There was also only limited interest in providing sitting civil servants with con-
stitutional guarantees that would have monetary value (i.e. compensation pay-
ments). The other aspect of loyalty debates was the issue of political
interference. The Mills Report in particular argued that local politicians
showed limited respect for civil servants, thereby creating a climate of distrust
that would reduce government capability at large.
Conclusions
This article contributes to the assessment of Jamaica’s (and other Caribbean
islands’) colonial legacy, and to contemporary policy debates about the rejec-
tion or reform of British administrative institutions and practices. While our
analysis points to the difﬁculty in sustaining in everyday practice the under-
standings of the colonial-era PSB, it paradoxically also points to its persistence,
and therefore also to the difﬁculty in adapting a colonial-era administrative doc-
trines to the post-independence era. Presciently, a report to the Government of
Jamaica prepared under the United Nations Programme of Technical Assist-
ance (Angus, Barrett, & Holstein, 1965) published only three years after inde-
pendence highlights how the persistence of a colonial-era bargain founded on
insulation from political factors imperilled the survival of the civil service itself.
Although praising Jamaica’s ‘strong, uncorrupt civil service’ as ‘a national
asset of incalculable and fundamental value’ (Angus et al., 1965, para. 1.),
the report nonetheless saw a lack of responsiveness to elected ministers as a
serious threat to the survival of a permanent career civil service in Jamaica
(Angus et al., 1965, para. 7).
As the civil service proved unable or unwilling to ‘serve different political
masters and give loyal and effective service to each one’, then ‘ministers will
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inevitably be faced with the temptation to press for the appointment to positions
of responsibility in the civil service of people who will in fact carry out their
policies and plans’ (Angus et al., 1965, para. 7). The PSB analysis developed
here helps to explain the deeper doctrinal and institutional factors that impeded
the responsiveness of the Jamaican civil service.
Beyond these speciﬁc and practical lessons for Caribbean administration,
our analysis points to a number of broader lessons for comparative scholarship.
For example, the contemporary literature on comparative politics has pointed to
different developmental trajectories depending on whether territories were gov-
erned on the basis of ‘direct rule’ and ‘indirect rule’, especially in the case of
British colonial rule (Gerring, Ziblatt, Van Gorp, & Arevalo, 2011; Lange,
Mahoney, & vom Hau, 2008; Mahoney, 2010).
If colonialism is, as Hobson (1905, p. 5) famously suggested, ‘the power of
colonists to transplant the civilisation they represent to the new natural and
social environment in which they ﬁnd themselves’, then a much more contex-
tual approach towards the extent and limits of this power is required. The
broader potential of PSB analysis is to combine such a contextual approach
with the generalising ambitions of social science. Such an approach requires
a move beyond a reliance on select secondary sources on which the literature
on colonial legacies, like the wider literature on historical institutionalism, is
based. The differences we traced between the doctrines of colonial rule and
the everyday experience of ofﬁcials point to the risks in relying only on the
former.
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Notes
1. Except where otherwise indicated, all archival references in this article are to ﬁles
held in The National Archives, Kew, London.
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2. Bustamante argued in the House of Representatives that ‘ . . . every one of us knows
it is a fact that the great majority of those who have had College training are almost
absolute failures, and some are failures’ (The Gleaner, 10 August 1950).
3. According to the Gleaner, Manley accused his opponents of not having considered
the Mills Report, and, instead, displaying an ‘abundance of expression of bad
manners, of strange noises more appropriate to the cattle pen and pig sty’.
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